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Insurance
by Maximilian A. Pock*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The big news for 1991 is the repeal of Georgia's No-Fault Act. The
Dawkins/Taylor Bill,1 which became law in- April 1991 and effective on
October 1, 1991, surgically exscinded all no-fault provisions from the
Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act and replaced them
with an extensively revamped compulsory automobile liability insurance
system.' During its sixteen-year reign, Georgia's no-fault regime, embroidered by numerous amendments, has spawned an amount of litigation
that rivals or surpasses that of the Uninsured Motorist Act." At least ten
percent of all appellate judge-time was devoured by no-fault cases. Accordingly, the purveyors of no-fault, who captured our consumerite imaginations in the early seventies, now agree that a bad no-fault law is worse
than none. Georgia's modified no-fault law suspended the torts system
only in regard to no-fault limits.5 Although the statute permitted insurance consumers to purchase optional coverage6 beyond the basic five
thousand dollar limit,7 the low five hundred dollar threshold for plugging
* Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center. University of

Iowa (J.D., 1958); University of Michigan Law School (S.J.D., 1962). Associate Professor of
Law, Emory University Law School (1961-1965). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 1991 Ga. Laws 1608.
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-1 to -16.3 (1990 & Supp. 1991) (repealed 1991). The Dawkins/Taylar Bill repeals and replaces the provisions previously found in O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-2 to -17
with a new Chapter 34. To avoid confusion, all reference to the repealed version will be
followed by a parenthetical, i.e., (repealed 1991).
3.

Id. §§ 33-34-1 to -8 (Supp. 1991).

4. d. § 33-7-11 (1990 & Supp. 1991). The litigation-proneness of uninsured and underin.
sured motorist coverage is a national phenomenon. See RE. KzzroN & AI WwIss, INSUtAlCz LAw § 4.9(a) (1988).
5. See O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-3(d)(1)(B) to -5(a)(3) (1990) (repealed 1991). The insurer's
right to subrogation was commensurately limited except for two isolated instances. Id.
6.

Id. § 33-34-5(A)(1) (repealed 1991). Up to an aggregate limit of $50,000 per person. Id.

7. Id. § 33-34-4(a)(2) (repealed 1991).
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into the torts systems and obtaining compensation for noneconomic
losses, such as pain and suffering, was unrealistically low. Georgia's nofault law was truly an ersatz system, and few will mourn its demise.
The Dawkins/Taylor Bill is a piece of omnibus legislation containing a
cornucopia of substantive and procedural changes. This Article addresses
two of the most salient changes. The first change revises and strengthens
the "Insureds' Bill of Rights,"' which relates to the unlawful nonrenewal
and cancellation of automobile or motorcycle insurance policies. The law
now permits aggrieved insureds to vindicate their rights by obtaining a
speedy hearing before the Commissioner of Insurance.10 The Commissioner is authorized to "order such penalties as he determines are appropriate in the event of an abusive nonrenewal or cancellation." 11
The second revision directs the Commissioner of Insurance to "provide
by rule or regulation procedures for the expeditious and efficient settlement of first-party property damage claims under personal private passenger motor vehicle policies"12 involving a variety of contentious
issues,
14
such as "[c]ost of repairs"18 and "[u]se of aftermarket parts. '
The past year has produced a bountiful harvest of well over 100 insurance cases. 16 Rather than attempt to discuss them all within the necessary confines of this Article, an informed and perhaps random selection of
cases has been made. In order to assure continuity, the cases selected for
comment will be discussed in conformance with subject matter headings
used in past years.

II.

ASSIGNMENTS

The insurer's indiscriminate reliance upon contractual prohibitions of
policy assignments without the insurer's written consent may have a high
price. These prohibitions are redundant to the extent they relate to the
assignment of the policy itself, because such assignment affects the risk
assumed by the insurer and is therefore ineffective at common law. They
are void to the extent they relate to the assignment of proceeds under a
policy, because such an assignment does not affect the risk assumed by
the insurer.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. § 33-34-2(13) (repealed 1991).
Id. § 33-24-45 (Supp. 1991).
Id.
Id.

12. Id. § 33-34-8.
13. Id. § 33-34-8(2).
14. Id. § 33-34-8(4).
15. The number of appellate cases dealing with insurance law increased from an annual
average of 60 in the 1970s to an average of 90 in the 1980s. Significant variations, however,
occurred from year to year.
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In Santiago v. Safeway Insurance Co.,' the insureds assigned the proceeds of a no-fault policy to their health care provider after they were
injured in an automobile collision." A divided court held the assignment
valid between the parties upon execution and perfected against the insurer upon notification. 1' The prohibition was of no effect and "superfluous."' Furthermore, the assignee could bring an action in his own name
as the real party in interest 0 and not in the name of the assignor for the
use of the assignee.'
In Klempner v. Safeway Insurance Co.,"2 the court expanded the reach
of Santiago by recognizing the insurers' liability to the assignee, not only
for, the proceeds but also for statutory bad faith penalties and attorney
fees.28 The statute expressly contemplates that benefits "may be paid...
directly to persons. . . supplying. . . services. . . to the claimant" and
allows "the person entitled to the benefits" to sue for benefits as well as
penalties.2 Accordingly, the reasonable meaning of the phrase "person
entitled to the benefits" was not restricted to the original claimant."5
The Author submits that this conclusion, whatever its effect upon the
insurer's compliance with its obligations, is not necessarily supported by
the quoted language. The phrase "may be paid" is permissive. It does not
denote that those who "may" be paid are automatically "entitled" to be
paid, which is a predicate for the recovery of penalties.

III.

BINDER

Green v. ProgressiveInsurance Co.26 shows that the complexities of insurance law can be a veritable minefield for unsophisticated consumers of
insurance, a commodity that is affected with a public interest and simply
indispensable in modem society. In Green an owner of an automobile applied to an independent agent for a liability policy. She made the required forty percent down payment on the policy and completed an ap16. 196 Ga. App. 480, 396 S.E.2d 506 (1990).
17. Id. at 480, 396 S.E.2d at 507.
18. Id. at 480-81, 396 S.E.2d at 508.
19. Id. at 481, 396 S.E.2d at 508.
20. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17(a) (1982 & Supp. 1991).
21. This was the case under the former Code of Georgia. GA. CODz ANN. § 81-1307 (Harrison 1933) (repealed 1966).
22. 196 Ga. App. 639, 396 S.E.2d 527 (1990). Klempner aligned itself with the plurality
opinion in Santiago that, having been adopted by a 4-1-4 vote, was technically devoid of
precedential value. Santiago, 196 Ga. App. at 482, 396 S.E.2d at 509.
23. 196 Ga. App. at 639, 396 S.E.2d at 527-28.
24. O.C.G.A. § 33-34-6(b) (1990) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added).
25. 196 Ga. App. at 639, 396 S.E.2d at 528.
26. 196 Ga. App. 733, 397 S.E.2d 20 (1990).
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plication that bound coverage at 12:30 p.m. that day. The application also
stated that coverage would end at 12:30 p.m. on February 28, 1988. The
insurer issued a policy that stated the coverage would end at 12:01 a.m.
on February 28, 1988. The insured was involved in an accident which occurred after 12:01 a.m. and possibly before 12:30 p.m. on that date. 7 The
court held that the insurer's denial of liability was justified because "the
policy superseded any temporary binder of coverage which may have existed"' and "had expired by its own terms by the time the accident occurred."" However, the applicant never received the policy because the
insurer sent it to the wrong address
"[d]ue to an apparent transcription
80'
error made by the sales agent.
The intermediary, described as an "independent agent," was obviously
not a "broker" acting solely as an agent for the applicant. 1 Although an
independent agent is an agent for the insured when advising the applicant on the selection of a proper policy, he becomes an agent for the specific insurer when he binds that insurer under a pre-existing representational agreement. The agent's knowledge acquired within the scope of his
employment and his transcription errors are then imputed to the insurer.
Should the law permit the insurers to hide behind the expiration date
in a policy that was never received due to the fault of its own agent? Are
applicants charged with knowledge that binders are not effective beyond
ninety days or superseded by policies that they never received? 3 Although this hard-boiled common law view of the insured-agent-insurer
triad, which is by no means limited to Georgia, may enhance predictability and reduce protracted and murky litigation, it may do so at the expense of equity.
In Georgia, conditional binding receipts provide temporary life insur3
ance only if their terms so provide.' 8 In Robertson v. Life Insurance Co., 4
the court expressly rejected the notion, which has emerged in a number of
27. Id. at 733-34, 397 S.E.2d at 21.
28. Id. at 734, 397 S.E.2d at 21.
29. Id.

30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. O.C.G.A. I 33-24-33(b) (1990). The facts in Green should be distinguished from
those in Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Snipes, 196 Ga. App. 727, 396 S.E.2d 808 (1990), which
appropriately held that an applicant who had not paid or made a downpayment on the first

premium upon receiving a binder or thereafter, had no coverage at all. Id. at 727-28, 396
S.E.2d at 808-09. Assuming, arguendo, that the binder provided coverage, its term would

not extend beyond the statutory termination date. Id. at 728, 396 S.E.2d at 809.
33. See, e.g., Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Etheridge, 223 Ga. 231, 154
S.E.2d 369 (1967), noted in M.A. Pock, Insurance, 20 MzRczR L. Rev. 132, 134-35 (1969).
34. 196 Ga. App. 294, 396 S.E.2d 35 (1990).
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jurisdictions,"' that application binders "accompanied by a prepaid premium"" provide interim life insurance "on the rationale that the insurer
is otherwise unjustly enriched by its receipt of interest from the prepaid
premium. '
IV.
A.

CONSTRUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

Arising Out Of

The impressive body of Georgia case law applying the statutory conditions for entitlement to no-fault benefits has not simplified the task of
prediction. Elusive factual nuances that do not lend themselves to rubric
are often outcome-determinative. A juxtaposition of two recent cases provides a useful illustration.
In Boykin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 8 the insured filled her car with gas at a service station, paid for the gas in the
station, and proceeded to her car. As she reached for the door handle,
"she slipped and fell on wet oily pavement" and sustained injuries." She
never made contact with her car. The court held she was not entitled to
no-fault benefits.' Even if one concedes that she was "occupying" the
vehicle, which is defined as being "engaged in the immediate act of entering into ... the motor vehicle,"1 her injuries definitely did not arise "out
of the operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle."" The connection between her injury and the vehicle was too tenuous and "remote" to
raise a jury question.' The trial court had correctly denied her claim to
coverage as a matter of law."
In First Financial Insurance Co. v.Rainey," the insured sat on the
passenger seat and thus obviously "occupied" the car. A four-inch thick
35. Probably the leading case representing this emerging view is Smith v. Westland Life
Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975).
36. 196 Ga. App. at 295, 396 S.E.2d at 35.
37. Id., 396 S.E.2d at 35-36. Professor Williston explains that the benefit to the insurer
resulting from the use of the applicant's premium is offset by the burdensome expenses

accruing to the insurer in connection with the processing of applications, many of which,
being mere contractual offers, are withdrawn while being processed. 7 S. WILLISTON, WILISTON ON CONTIACTS § 902A (3d ed. 1963).
38. 195 Ga. App. 401, 393 S.E.2d 470 (1990).
39. Id. at 401, 393 S.E.2d at 471.
40. Id. at 402, 393 S.E.2d at 472.
41.

O.C.G.A. § 33-34-2(8) (1990) (repealed 1991).

42. Id. § 33-34-2(1) (repealed 1991).
43. 195 Ga. App. at 402, 393 S.E.2d at 471.
44. Id.
45. 195 Ga. App. 655, 394 S.E.2d 774 (1990), affd in relevant part, First Fin. Ins. Co. v.
Rainey, 261 Ga. 52, 401 S.E.2d 490 (1991).
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limb fell from a tree onto the open door of the car, was deflected, and
struck the insured on the back of the head."' The court held that the
injuries arose out of the "operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle" and that the trial court properly granted the insured's
motion for summary judgment."O
After a discursive review of pertinent Georgia decisions resembling an
A.L.R. annotation, the court concluded that the phrase "arising out of"
did not equate with direct or proximate causation and that "'almost any
causal connection or relationship will do.'" If the victim was occupying
the insured vehicle when the injury occurred, Georgia courts have applied
the liberal rule that such causal nexus exists whenever the injury would
not have occurred "'but for' the operation, maintenance or use of the
[vehicle] . . . ." The court also confirmed that "this liberality has not
abated" in recent years.5 1
These two cases suggest that the test of coverage, instead of stressing
nexus and occupancy as coequal prerequisites, has subtly shifted from the
former to the latter. In Rainey the victim was occupying the vehicle and
using it as a passenger. The court concluded that "but for" his use the
injury would not have happened.5 2 In Boykin the court conceded, albeit
with some hesitation, that the victim might have been occupying her vehicle when she reached for its door handle." If that was the case then she
was also "using" her vehicle. Her injury would not have occurred "but
for" her use of the vehicle as an occupant. The factual distinction between a passenger-occupant and a driver-occupant appears a bit metaphysical, clouding the relative precedential values of these two cases. "
"Loading or unloading a motor vehicle by any person acting within the
course of his employment in any business" is an activity expressly excluded from the reach of the terms "operation, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle."' In Hernandez v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,6 this
46. 195 Ga. App. at 656-56, 394 S.E.2d at 776.
47. O.C.G.A. § 33-34-2(9) (1990) (repealed 1991); see also id. § 33-34-2(1) (repealed
1991).
48. 196 Ga. App. at 658, 394 S.E.2d at 776.
49. Id. at 656, 394 S.E.2d at 775 (quoting Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 142
Ga. App. 562, 563-64, 236 S.E.2d 650, 551 (1977)).
50. Id. at 657, 394 S.E.2d at 776 (quoting Franklin v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 160 Ga.
App. 279, 282, 287 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1981)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
63. 195 Ga. App. 401, 402, 393 S.E.2d 470, 471 (1990).
54. See Rainey, 195 Ga. App. at 662, 394 S.E.2d at 780 (Birdsong, J., dissenting) (characterizing falling limbs as "acts of God").
55. O.C.G.A. § 33-34-2(9) (1990) (repealed 1991).
56. 197 Ga. App. 18, 397 S.E.2d 482 (1990).
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exclusion was the nemesis of an employee who became unconscious and
fell while "occupying" and "using" the vehicle in the course of "unloading" its cargo.57 The language of the statute superseded the general rule
construing coverage provisions broadly and exclusions narrowly."
B. Hit-And-Run Automobile
Phantom automobiles continue to bedevil victims who seek recoveries
against their uninsured motorist carriers. The Georgia Code currently
provides for such recoveries only when the tortfeasor is unknown and
hence deemed uninsured, and when the offending vehicle is a hit-and-run
automobile that has made "actual physical contact" with the victim's vehicle." A narrow exception is carved out for those cases in which the accident is caused by a phantom automobile without actual contact if the
victim manages to give a description "of how the occurrence occurred"
and another eyewitness corroborates it.6° Even a perfect description by
the victim is of no avail if corroboration is inadequate, as was the case in
National Surety Corp. v. O'Dell," where several witnesses saw the victim's truck turn over, but "no eyewitnesses corroborated, except by conjecture, [the victim's] claim that the accident was caused by the unknown
vehicle."' 2 A more perplexing question arises if the facts are reversed and
the corroboration is perfect, but the victim's description is spotty. Just
how specific must the victim's description be?
In Bell v. Coronet Insurance Co.,"3 the court reiterated that a description must go beyond the facts of the accident (the result) and contain at
least a reference to the unknown vehicle (the cause).*' Thus, the most
compelling eyewitness testimony is of no use when the victim testifies
that she never saw the "burgundy LTD" that allegedly cut in front of the
driver who actually struck her."6
57. Id. at 18-19, 397 S.E.2d at 482-83.
58. Id. at 19, 397 S.E.2d at 483. The court noted that language which would have negated the exclusion was. expressly deleted by the Georgia General Assembly. Id. Where a
policy provides a broader substantive "loading and unloading" coverage than mandated by a
subsequent statutory amendment, such amendment does not automatically effect or limit
the broader coverage in the policy unless the policy itself is changed by an amendatory
indorsement supported by consideration (e.g., by a premium reduction). Rothnell v. Continental Casualty Co., 198 Ga. App. 545, 402 S.E.2d 293 (1991).
59. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(2) (1990 & Supp. 1991).

60. Id.
61. .195 Ga. App. 374, 393 S.E.2d 504 (1990).
62. Id. at 375, 393 S.E.2d at 505.
63. 197 Ga. App. 211, 398 S.E.2d 242 (1990).
64. Id. at 212-13, 398 S.E.2d at 243.
65. Id. at 212, 398 S.E.2d at 243. The court relied on Hoffman v. Doe, 191 Ga. App. 319,
381 S.E.2d 546 (1989) in which the insured positively remembered there was no third vehi-
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The holding in Atlanta Casualty Insurance Co. v. Crews" indicates
that the description requirement can accommodate shades of grey and
does not necessarily cut off meritorious claims with the precision of a
guillotine. The victim testified: "I saw a blur come at me and I woke up in
the hospital ... [ilt was a dark blur." 7 The driver of the pickup truck
that struck the victim's car and a disinterested third-party eyewitness
testified that "a dark blue, or a black or dark car ... stopped rapidly in
front of [the driver] causing him to brake, lose control of his vehicle on
the wet street, and crash into [the victim]." ' The court held that substantial compliance with the description requirement is sufficient because
the victim's deposition sufficiently implicated the phantom vehicle as a
causal factor in the occurrence.? This fact was fully corroborated by the
more specific but fully compatible testimony of the other witnesses. To
conclude otherwise would be to impute to the legislature an intent "to
create a rule which would arbitrarily preclude coverage, for example, of a
victim injured so rapidly or so severely she could not testify as to how the
occurrence happened, regardless of the number of competent witnesses
"70

Maxwell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.71 involved a
curious twist rarely encountered in phantom car cases. The insurance policy concerned did not track the definitional language of the Uninsured
Motorist Act.7' The policy dispensed with the victim's description and
stated that "'the facts of the accident can be corroborated by an eyewitness to the occurrence other than [the claimant].' ",7" This clause in the
policy saved the day for the victim who never saw the uninsured vehicle.
C. Pre-existing Condition
The 1943 New York fire insurance policy and its progeny have practically become the law of the land in that their language is widely mandated by regulatory statutes or voluntarily replicated in homeowners' polcle on the road and thus contradicted the witnesses' testimony, a factual nuance not present
in Bell. 197 Ga. App. at 213, 398 S.E.2d at 243.
66. 197 Ga. App. 48, 397 S.E.2d 466 (1990).
67. Id. at 49, 397 S.E.2d at 467.
68. Id. at 48, 397 S.E.2d at 467. The court noted that even drivers who are named as
defendants in the case and who have a stake in the outcome may furnish corroborating
evidence that a phantom vehicle caused the accident. The statute does not require witnesses
to be disinterested. Id. at 49-50, 397 S.E.2d at 50 (citing Universal Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lowery,
257 Ga. 363, 359 S.E.2d 898 (1987)).
69. Id. at 50-51, 397 S.E.2d at 468-69.
70. Id. at 50, 397 S.E.2d at 468.
71. 196 Ga. App. 545, 396 S.E.2d 291 (1990).
72. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(2) (1990 & Supp. 1991).
73. 196 Ga. App. at 547, 396 S.E.2d at 392 (quoting the insurance policy).
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icies. 7' Such standardization is not found in health insurance policies
which, arguably, affect spheres of human interest that extend dramatically beyond concerns about property losses. Exclusions for pre-existing
conditions are particularly puriform.
Liberty NationalInsurance Co. v. Davis" involved one straightforward
variant that excluded 'coverage for a medical condition "'which manifested itself, or for which medical advice was given or treatment recommended by or received from a physician within two years before the effective date.' , This language posed no difficulty for the court. Because the
language was nonambiguous it resisted beneficent construction through
contra proferentem. The terms "manifested," "advice," and "treatment"
were obviously used in the disjunctive and thus triggered the exclusion
(treatment for fibrocystic breast disease) if any of the three alternative
events occurred.7 7
Bergan v. Time Insurance Co.7 involved a variant of the policy in Liberty that omitted the term "manifested" and excluded only coverage for
"'an illness or injury for which medical care, treatment, medicine or advice was received during the six-month period immediately prior to the
effective date. . . ."7 The insured complained about what she thought
was a bladder infection and was told by her general practitioner to see a
gynecologist for an ultrasound examination. The gynecologist recommended that she "'seriously consider' undergoing an exploratory laparotomy" to evaluate a pelvic abnormality which he had discovered." The
laparotomy, which was performed shortly after the claimant's insurance
became effective, revealed for the first time that she was suffering from
low grade cancer. The claimant contended she was covered because her
illness was not diagnosed until after the effective date of her policy.
Whatever advice she had received previously did not relate to that particular illness.81 The court rejected this contention, explaining that the otherwise undefined term "advice," understood in its "plain, ordinary, and
popular sense" ' basically denotes a" 'recommendation offered as a guide
74. See WR VANCE, HAmSOOK ON ThU LAW OF INSUtANCE 808 (3d ed. 1951). One suspects that insurers, although normally averse to regulation, welcomed this specific regulation
because it prevented unethical insurers from engaging in unfair competition by flooding the
market with debased and presumably cheaper insurance products.
75. 198 Ga. App. 343, 401 SE.2d 555 (1991).
76. Id. at 343, 401 S.E.2d at 555 (quoting the insurance policy) (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. 196 Ga. App. 78, 395 S.E.2d 361 (1990).
79. Id. at 79, 395 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting the insurance policy).

80. Id.
81. Id. at 78-80, 395 S.E.2d at 362-63.
82. Id. at 80, 395 S.E.2d at 363.
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to action . . . .'83 Two physicians "advised" the claimant in regard to
the very illness which was later identified as cancer. Accordingly, her
claim was barred by the clear import of the exclusion."
The Author submits that the court's rationale is less than apodictic.
The claimant did not secure advice for a specific illness but for a condition which caused her discomfort. The advice she did receive was to explore whether her condition amounted to an illness. In light of the long
standing maxim that exclusions are to be narrowly construed, the court
might well have been persuaded to accept the claimant's argument that
she had never received advice for the illness, which was only subsequently
identified as such.
D. Sickness
Combined Insurance Co. v. Reagprovides an example of the troublesome issues that can arise when insurance policy definitions depart from
commonly accepted definitions of risks. The insured became totally disabled as a result of allergic sensitization caused by the city's accidental
discharge of toxic fumes into her florist shop. The medical disability policy in question provided five year coverage for disability resulting from
sickness and extended coverage for disability resulting from accident. Her
physician certified that her disability had resulted from sickness. Accordingly, the insurer stopped payments when the initial five-year coverage
period terminated.8 The physician had been unaware of the fact that the
policy defined "sickness" as "'illness or disease causing Total Disability
which commences while this Policy is in force. . . . "' The insured was
saved by her physician's subsequent affidavit explaining that he had used
the term "sickness" in its accepted medical signification as "'a condition
of deviation from the normal health state.' " This "deviation" had not
simply commenced as defined by the policy, but had been the direct result of an injury or accident that made the insured eligible for continued
disability benefits under the extended coverage provisions of the policy."
83. Id. (quoting RANDOM Hovs DicONARy or M ENGLISH LANGuAGE (2d ed. 1987)).
84. Id. Compare Freeman v. Mid-South Ins. Co., 197 Ga. App. 445, 398 S.E.2d 727
(1990), in which the court held that an exclusion of pro-existing conditions for which drugs
were prescribed by a physician during the twelve month period preceding the policy's effective date applied to drugs prescribed earlier and for which refills were procured without any
further prescription. Id. at 445-46, 398 S.E.2d at 727-28.
85. 195 Ga. App. 701, 394 S.E.2d 624 (1990).
86. Id. at 701-02, 394 S.E.2d at 625.
87. Id. at 702, 394 S.E.2d at 625 (emphasis added) (quoting the insurance policy).
88. Id. (quoting physician's affidavit).

89. Id.
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DEFENSE-INSURER's DUTY To ExTEND

The court in Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority v. Continental
Insurance Co.,"0 a case of first impression in Georgia, determined
"whether ordinary negligence in maintaining [an insured ambulance]
which then breaks down, delaying transport and treatment of a patient
waiting for the ... ambulance, but never transported in it" ' was an insured event under a comprehensive business policy carried by the hospital that operated the ambulance."2 The policy provided in pertinent part
that the insurer was obligated to pay damages "'caused by an accident
and resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a covered auto
[and that the insurer had] no duty to defend suits for bodily injury...
not covered by this endorsement.' "9 Two endorsements expressly excluded coverage for liability due to "'rendering or failure to render any
medical, surgical, dental, x-ray or nursing service or treatment."'" The
court reiterated Georgia's long standing rule that an insurer's duty to defend is predicated almost exclusively upon the "allegations of the complainant."' The court held that these allegations did not actuate the malpractice/professional services exclusions nor the coverage itself." The
claimant alleged that "non-use or lack of availability for use" caused her
injuries.97 She should have alleged an accident caused by the use of the
insured vehicle to come within the policy's coverage."9 To hold that the
policy covered non-use "would lead to a bizarre result: [A] patient who is
mistreated in an insured ambulance while being transported would be denied coverage due to the professional malpractice exclusion ... but a patient who never entered the ambulance and whose treatment was delayed,
with consequent damages, would be covered.""
The Author submits that the court's conclusions are not as self-evident
as its syllogisms suggest. Although non-use does not equate with use, it
does not necessarily follow that non-maintenance or negligent maintenance does not equate with maintenance. The court's construction of
"caused by an accident and resulting from . ." practically limits coverage to collisions and other mishaps involving the vehicle in a direct and
90. 196 Ga. App. 399, 396 S.E.2d 50 (1990).
91. Id. at 401, 396 S.E.2d at 51.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 400, 396 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting the insurance policy).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 402, 396 S.E.2d at 52 (citing Presidential Hotel v. Canal Ins. Co., 188 Ga. App.
609, 610, 373 S.E.2d 671, 672 (1988)).
96. Id. at 401-02, 396 S.E.2d at 52.

97. Id. at 402, 396 S.E.2d at 52.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 401-02, 396 S.E.2d at 52.
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physical sense. If one remembers the purpose for which ambulances are
maintained, perhaps it would have been possible to apply contra proferentem and to hold that the complainant's misadventure was an accident
resulting from the ambulance being negligently maintained.
VI. GROUP INSURANCE
Group administrators and intermediaries are really fiduciaries sui
generis. They resist traditional agency classifications since they are not in
any realistic sense subject to the control of their principals (the insureds
or the group insurer), which is the touchstone for agency relationships. 10
Yet, so long as agency classifications prevail, the Georgia rule seems preferable to those adopted in many other jurisdictions that dogmatically
treat the intermediary either as agent solely for the insureds or as agent
solely for the group insurer throughout the entire relationship. 10 1 Such
myopic unitary characterization is avoided by the Georgia rule, which
holds that the intermediary acts as agent for the insureds in structural
matters, such as the procurement, modification, termination, and replacement of group insurance.103 Once a given policy is in effect, the intermediary acts as agent for the insurer in routine matters, such as adding individuals to the policy as beneficiaries. 10 '
The court in Miles v. Great Southern Life Insurance Co.1 " reaffirmed
and applied this rule when it held that an employer/group administrator
acted solely as agent of the insurer when it, or its designate, processed an
employee's application for a family group insurance participation certificate under a previously issued and existing master policy. 10 ' Since the
group insurer, like any other insurer, does not owe a fiduciary duty to its
insureds when dealing with them through its agents, an alleged breach of
its obligations under the participation certificate and the master policy
will only make it vulnerable to breach of contract action.'" In the absence of extraordinary circumstances creating a confidential relationship,
the breach cannot be tortured into an action sounding in tort.107
100. See KsMN & Wmiss, supra note 4, at § 2.5(d).
101. See Roszwr H. Jaaay, UNDRRSTADINo INsuRANCz

LAw § 121 (1987).
102. 196 Ga. App. at 639, 396 S.E.2d at 527-28.
103. See, e.g., Dawes Mining Co. v. Callahan, 246 Ga. 531, 272 S.E.2d 267, aft'g, 154 Ga.
App. 229, 267 S.E.2d 830 (1980); Calhoun v. Kut-Kwick Corp., 172 Ga. App. 511, 323 S.E.2d
699 (1984).
104. 197 Ga. App. 540, 398 S.E.2d 772 (1990).
105. Id. at 541, 398 S.E.2d at 774.
106. For a recent insightful article on the desiderataand the drawbacks of restructuring
the insured-insurer relationship, see William T. Barker, Paul E.B. Glad & Steven M. Levy,
Is an Insurer a Fiduciaryto its Insured.?, 25 TORT & INsvuwcE LJ. 1 (1989).
107. 197 Ga. App. at 542, 398 S.E.2d at 774.
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VII.

INSURABLE INTEREST-PROPERTY

Does a recorded conveyance, unaccompanied by any change in possession, under an agreement that contemplated an immediate conveyance
and that was carried out thirteen days later before any fire loss occurred,
violate a change-of-interest clause in a property insurance policy and allow the insurer to avoid coverage? Does the fact that the conveyance had.
for its sole purpose the fraudulent concealment of assets from the insured's creditors allow the insurer to avoid coverage on grounds of public
policy? The court in Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Brown'" held that the change-of-interest clause, which provided the policy was to be "'null and void in case of any change in interest, title or
possession,' "109 was indeed violated. Yet, this violation suspended the
policy only temporarily, and the policy was revived when the violation
ceased.110 The outcome would be otherwise if a loss had occurred during
the violation, or if the violation had increased the risk and a loss had
resulted from the increased risk, or if the loss had occurred during the
period when the risk was increased."' Neither was the case here. Furthermore, public policy does "not strip the alleged perpetrator of the fraud of
all contractual rights with third parties. 112 This conduct, while reprehensible, presents an issue that is "properly addressed in another action by
another litigant." 1"
VIII.

INTERMEDIARIES-INDEPENDENT AGENTS AND BROKERS

Byrne v. Reardon'14 illustrates that negligent insurance professionals
may expose themselves to liability in tort that may encompass draconian
punitive damages even when actual damages are fairly negligible. 1 5 It
makes, no difference whether these professionals are brokers, who are
merely given a license to hunt for a suitable insurer, or media-touted independent agents, who are empowered to bind various insurers under
108. 260 Ga. 160, 390 S.E.2d 586 (1990), af'g 192 Ga. App. 504, 385 S.E.2d 87 (1989).
109. 260 Ga. at 160, 390 S.E.2d at 587 (quoting the insurance policy).
110. Id. at 161, 390 S.E.2d at 587 (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 181 Ga. 139, 143-44,

182 S.E. 41, 43 (1935)).
111. Id. at 162, 390 S.E.2d at 587-88. This includes losses which occur after the violation
has formally ceased but before the increased risk has abated.

112. Id.
113. Id.
114.

196 Ga. App. 735, 397 S.E.2d 22 (1990).

115. Id. at 735, 397 S.E.2d at 23.
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pre-existing representational contracts."1 However, the specific relation-

ship between these intermediaries and their clients makes a difference.
In Frageau v. Hall,"' an applicant for insurance learned that her existing policy on two buildings would not be renewed because the underwriter had ceased doing business in the state. She requested a broker to
obtain quotes on replacement coverage in a specified amount. The broker
examined the existing policy and "obtained quotes for the same coverage
from several carriers."' s The applicant selected the least expensive
quote, and a policy was procured. When one of the buildings collapsed,
the insurer justifiably denied liability because its policy did not provide
collapse coverage."1' Was the broker liable for negligent failure to provide
full coverage? The court answered this question with a resounding
"No!""20 The applicant, by her own testimony, had requested the broker
to provide specific coverage.' 2 ' This created "an arms-length business relationship between the parties" that imposed upon the broker a routine
ministerial duty to comply with the precise request."22 This relationship
did not relieve the applicant of her duty to read the policy or, if the policy was unavailable before the loss, to read the application, which in this
case "clearly indicates the type of coverage to be provided.""' Her failure
to do so and to obtain timely rectification negated the broker's possible
negligence in complying with her request."' "[T]he agent may be held
liable .

.

. even if the insured fails to examine the policy"'

only when

the insured's agent holds herself out "as an expert in the field of insurance"' 6 and the applicant relies upon her for the performance of additional services that leave scope for discretion and expertise, "such as de116. See Wright Body Works, Inc. v. Columbus Interstate Ins. Agency, 233 Ga. 268, 210
S.E.2d 801 (1974) (discussed in Maximilian A. Pock, Insurance, 27 MZRCZR L. Rv. 121-22
(1975)).
117. 196 Ga. App. 493, 396 S.E.2d 241 (1990).
118. Id. at 493, 396 S.E.2d at 242.
119. Id. at 494, 396 S.E.2d at 242.
120. Id. at 494-95, 396 S.E.2d at 243.
121. Some dispute as to the type but not as to the amount of the coverage requested
existed. No dispute in regard to the contents of the application was present. Id. at 494, 396
S.E.2d at 242.
122. Id. at 495, 396 S.E.2d at 243.
123. Id. at 494, 396 S.E.2d at 243. The failure, on the part of the insured, to"read and
rectify a policy which is in the insured's possession antecedent to an uninsured loss bars any
torts recovery against an intermediary who negligently failed to perform a ministerialduty
to procure a "same coverage" replacement policy. See England v. Georgia-Florida Co., 198
Ga. App. 704, 402 S.E.2d 783 (1991).
124. 196 Ga. App. at 494, 396 S.E.2d at 243.
125. Id., 395 S.E.2d at 242 (relying upon the rationale in Etheridge v. Assoc. Mutuals,
160 Ga. App. 687, 288 S.E.2d 58 (1981)).
126. Id.
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termining the amount of insurance required." 1 7 Simply stated, this
decision means that Georgia law does not require the purchaser to look
over the agent's shoulders when the agent chooses a policy for the purchaser. The law requires otherwise when the agent is told what specific
policy to get.
IX. LIF INSURANCE-CONSENT

Insurable interest,2 s8 a state-imposed requirement to prevent wagering,
is not subject to the dispensations of waiver or estoppel."' Can the same
be said of the requirement that the cestui que vie give her consent to the
issuance of the policy on her life?
In Time Insurance Co. v. Lamar,"'0 a mother obtained insurance on her
adult son's life after placing her son's signature on the application "in the
presence of and at the direction of the insurance agent."'' After her son's
death, the insurer denied liability because the decedent, as cestui, never
gave his consent to the policy."' The court noted that Georgia's statutory
consent requirement is more restrictive than that at common law, which
is satisfied by showing that the policy was issued either with the knowledge or the consent of the cestui."'3 Georgia requires that an adult cestui
either apply for the policy in person or consent "in writing to the contract."' " In light of this unambiguous language, the court was constrained to find that the policy was void ab initio, despite the fact that
the insured had a clear insurable interest in her son's life."35
X. Loss PAYEE
What is the legal posture of a mortgagee under a deed to secure debt,
when it is discovered that the mortgagor complied with a covenant in the
deed to carry fire and extended coverage insurance on the premises, but
violated a covenant to name the mortgagee as loss payee? Georgia Farm
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-3(a) (1990 & Supp. 1991).

Id.
195 Ga. App. 452, 393 S.E.2d 734 (1990).
Id. at 452, 393 S.E.2d at 734.
Id. at 453, 393 S.E.2d at 734.

133. This requirement is the "generic" common law rule, but the issue is far from settIed. See EDWIN W. PATrRSON, EsszNJs or INsuRANcE LAW 167 (1957).
134. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6(a) (1990). This general consent requirement is subject to significant exceptions. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6(a)(1) (spouses may obtain insurance upon each
other's lives without consent) and O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6(a)(2) (persons having an insurable
interest in the life of a minor may obtain insurance upon the minor's life without consent).
135. 195 Ga. App. at 454, 393 S.E.2d at 735.
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Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Alma Exchange Bank & Trust"' supplies a partial answer to this question. When the mortgagee discovered
after a fire loss that it had not been named as loss payee in the policy, it
contacted the insurer and received a promise that its name would be included on all checks issued in payment for the loss. Subsequently, the
insured mortgagor sued the insurer. To avoid protracted litigation, the
insurer settled with the mortgagor and received a release in which the
mortgagor promised indemnity against potential third party claims under
the policy. When the insurer was sued by the mortgagee for breachof
promise to recognize the mortgagee's loss-payee status when paying
claims under the policy, the insurer contended that the promise was unenforceable for lack of consideration. 1 7 The court disagreed.," Although
the mortgagee was not initially a third party beneficiary under the policy,
it had a lien on the insured property and hence an equitable lien on the
insurance proceeds."'9 The mortgagee had a right to intervene in the action brought by the mortgagor against the insurer or to sue the insurer
directly.14 The mortgagee's forbearance from suit in reliance upon the
insurer's promise constituted sufficient consideration."'
It should be noted that the mortgagee had no rights as a third party
beneficiary under the policy. Nor could it seek reformation of the policy
unless the insurer had been subject to a tripartite agreement to issue a
policy naming the mortgagee as loss payee. Its equitable lien to the proceeds could not have been asserted against the insurer had the insurer
settled with the mortgagor without notice of the lien. The mortgagee's
rights derived solely from the insurer's subsequent promise.
XI. No-FAULT INSURANCE

Georgia's No-Fault Act, despite its demise on October 1, 1991,141 is
likely to cast a long shadow into the future. Quite a few cases will yet
begin to wend their way through our court system, and it will be years
before the last of them will have reached a conclusion. Therefore, no-fault
cases will continue to be a feature in these pages for some time to come.
136. 195 Ga. App. 103, 392 S.E.2d 320 (1990).
137. Id. at 104, 392 S.E.2d at 321.
138. Id., 392 S.E.2d at 322.
139. Id., 392 S.E.2d at 321.
140. Id.
141. Id. The court here uses the term "consideration" in its nontechnical sense as
"promissory estoppel or detrimental reliance" that is an alternative to or substitute for consideration in the traditional "bargain or exchange" sense.
142. The No-Fault Act remains in effect as to all policies in existence on October 1,
1991, until they are modified at the request of the insured or until their renewal dates. 1991
Ga. Laws 1608, § 3.1.
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In Cannon v. Lardner," the supreme court held that "aggregating" or
"stacking" of basic injury protection ("PIP") coverages was authorized in
principle. 14 ' Yet, before this exercise can be undertaken, the claimant
must first qualify as an insured under all policies that are potentially present upon the risk.
In this context, the Georgia statutory scheme mandates that under any
given policy PIP benefits must be made available to the named insured
and all additional insureds whenever the vehicle that is specifically designated as the insured vehicle is involved in an accident. 45 PIP benefits
must also be made available to the named insured and certain additional
insureds whenever a different vehicle is involved in an accident, but only
"when such . . . vehicle is not similarly insured;"'146 that is, when the
owner of the vehicle does not carry the required PIP coverage.147
In Georgia American Insurance Co. v. Bursed,4 5 the claimant was injured while riding as a passenger in a car whose owner carried basic PIP
coverage.1 4 ' The court held that he was not permitted to stack the basic
PIP coverage under the policy insuring his own car.15 0 Since the car in
which he was injured was "similarly insured" to his own car, he did not
qualify as an insured under his own policy.151 No "stackable" coverage
was available.152
In Worsham v. Pickeral/'s appellant contended the trial court improperly reduced her damage award against a tortfeasor by five thousand dollars for basic PIP benefits that she never received and to which she was
never "entitled."'" She claimed that, as a result of her agent's fraud, she
had no automobile insurance coverage at the time of her accident. The
court was sympathetic, but still held that she was eligible for coverage.1 6
143. 258 Ga. 332, 368 S.E.2d 730 (1988) (discussed in Maximilian A. Pock, Insurance,41
MzacR L. Rzv. 221, 221-22 (1989)).
144. "Stacking" is also authorized as to uninsured motorist coverage if more than one
policy is present upon the risk. "Stacking" is not authorized within a single policy which
contains separate coverages. Jenkins v. Lanigan, 196 Ga. App. 424, 396 S.E.2d 28 (1990).
145. See O.C.G.A. § 33-34-2(5) (1990) (repealed 1991).
146. Id. Additional insureds in this context does not include permittees.
147. See id. § 33-34-4.
148. 196 Ga. App. 626, 396 S.E.2d 793 (1990).
149. Id. at 626, 396 S.E.2d at 794.
150. Id. at 627, 396 S.E.2d at 794.
151. Id.
152. Accord Slack v. Superior Ins. Co., 198 Ga. App. 281, 401 S.E.2d 307 (1991) (Minor
struck by a car similarly insured to his father's car did not qualify under his father's

policy.).
153.
154.
Burch,
155.

195 Ga. App. 330, 393 S.E.2d 488 (1990).
For a general synopsis of proper procedures for post verdict write offs, see Bonds v.
196 Ga. App. 125, 395 S.E.2d 379 (1990).
195 Ga. App. at 330, 393 S.E.2d at 488-89.
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The court explained that the No-Fault Act generally suspended access to
the tort system for those who were "eligible" for its basic economic loss
benefits. 1" "Any person eligible" for no-fault benefits included "any person who is required" to obtain automobile insurance and was not limited
to "any person" who had actually obtained such insurance, as appellant
17
contended.
Is a carrier under an automobile owner's policy required to extend PIP
coverage in regard to a truck that is not owned, but only leased by its
insured? The court in Ryder Freight Systems v. Williams1 " answered
this question in the negative. Only the owner is required to provide PIP
coverage.11 ' The carrier may appropriately provide such coverage "'[o]nly
[for] those autos ... [the insured] own[s] [,] which are required to have
No-Fault benefits in the state where they are licensed or principally
garaged.' -M'o
Carriers providing basic or optional PIP coverage are only entitled to
subrogation when at least one of the vehicles involved in an accident
weighs "more than 6,500 pounds unloaded" 1 1 or when they extend optional PIP coverage for property damage to an insured motor vehicle. 1 2
Is this right to subrogation available against a liability insurer even when
it is shown that PIP benefits provide less than full compensation for the
victim? The court in Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Georgia Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.1s6 held that subrogation was available in
this case at least in principle.'" "'[C ]omplete compensation of the injured insured is a condition precedent to .. . subrogation only in the
event that the tortfeasor is uninsured and is not a self insurer."'" Nevertheless, subrogation was unavailable since the liability insurer had in
good faith settled with the victim for the full policy limits. 1 "6All subrogation rights against the liability insurer were extinguished because permitting subrogation after exhaustion of the liability limits in the policy
"would necessarily constitute an unauthorized attempt to increase or en156. Id., 393 S.E.2d at 489 (citing Davidson v. Bradford, 248 Ga. 8, 11, 262 S.E.2d 780,
783 (1980)); O.C.G.A. I 33-34-9(b) (1990) (repealed 1991).
157. 195 Ga. App. at 330, 393 S.E.2d at 489 (relying on the supreme court's construction
of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-4 (1990) in Davidson, 245 Ga. at 8, 262 S.E.2d at 780).
158. 196 Ga. App. 802, 397 S.E.2d 152 (1990).
169. See O.C.G.A. § 33-34-4(a) (1990) (repealed 1991).
160. 196 Ga. App. at 804, 397 S.E.2d at 153 (quoting the insurance policy).
161. O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(d)(1)(A) (1990) (repealed 1991).
162. Id. § 33-34-3(d)(1)(B) (repealed 1991).
163. 195 Ga. App. 784, 395 S.E.2d 264 (1990).
164. Id. at 785, 395 S.E.2d at 265.
165. Id. (quoting Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 193 Ga. App.
240, 240-41, 387 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1989)).
166. Id.
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large the limits of that policy." 117 This apparent catch-22 situation raises
the question of whether, as a practical matter, a liability insurer can ever
be vulnerable to claims for subrogation. The answer is provided by
Southern General Insurance Co. v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance
Co., ' in which the court explained that "a liability carrier that settles
with the injured party for less than the policy limits does so at its own
risk and remains potentially liable for the no-fault carrier's subrogation
claim up to the policy limits."'"
XII. OMNMUS CLAUSE
Bailees or "permittees" of motor vehicles are covered as additional insureds under the omnibus clause in the owner's liability policy. Since they
are third party beneficiaries and not parties, they generally have to make
an express "election" to assert coverage under such a policy. 170 The supreme court in Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Starnes", held
that a bailee who has no automobile insurance policy of his own cannot
refuse to make such an election. 17' Georgia's public policy of requiring
liability insurance "'not only for the benefit of the insured but to ensure
compensation for innocent victims of negligent motorists'" compelled
this conclusion.178 The court brushed aside the insurer's argument that
this result would force parties "into a contractual relationship despite
their mutual desire to the contrary" by pointing out that "insurance law
occasionally requires parties to enter into relationships that are contractual in nature."' 7' 4
It should be noted that the court's application and redefinition of the
"rule of election" is limited to situations in which the additional insured
has no insurance. The court does not specifically address the situation of
an additional insured whose own insurance has lower liability limits than
those of the insurance'available to him by election. This issue will have to
await future litigation.
167. Id., 395 S.E.2d at 266.
168. 193 Ga. App. 240, 387 S.E.2d 435 (1989).
169. Id. at 241, 387 S.E.2d at 437.
170. Hicks v. Continental Ins. Co., 146 Ga. App. 124, 245 S.E.2d 482 (1978).
171. 260 Ga. 235, 392 S.E.2d 3, af'g Starnes v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 194 Ga. App.
320, 390 S.E.2d 419 (1990).
172. 260 Ga. at 238, 392 S.E.2d at 5. The driver "affirmatively renounced any intention
to seek coverage" under his employer's liability policy because he evidently felt that to do so
"would be to shirk individual responsibility for his own actions." 194 Ga. App. at 323, 390

S.E.2d at 421.
173. 260 Ga. at 237, 392 S.E.2d at 4 (quoting Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neese, 254
Ga. 335, 337, 329 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1985)).

174.

d., 392 S.E.2d at 5.
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The new-wave "simple English" or "easy reading" automobile policies
are now beginning to percolate through our court system. They provide in
awkward but clear terms that no person shall be considered an insured
person if that person uses "a vehicle without a reasonable belief"17 of
having permission to use the vehicle. The court of appeals had two occasions to delineate the reach of this exclusion.
In Omni Insurance Co. v. Harps,1 7 the husband of the named insured,
who was himself an additional insured under the policy's omnibus clause,
took his wife's keys while she was asleep, drove off in her car, and was
involved in a collision. No one disputed that his wife had given him the
keys only "for safekeeping in case she lost her set. 17 7 He had no driver's
license, and it was understood that he was not to use the car without first
securing permission. Prior to the collision, he had occasionally violated
this understanding. These violations had always resulted in arguments.
At no time had his wife ratified his use without permission. In fact, he
admitted that he had not bothered to wake her before his last and fateful
escapade because he had been drinking and knew she would never give
him permission to use the car. 178 The court held that although he was an
additional omnibus insured under the policy, the operation of the exclusion would not be affected.1"" He was uninsured if he lacked a "reasonable
belief" that he obtained either implied or express permission to use the
vehicle. 180 This objective standard would not be met by a unilateral subjective belief.1 81 While "[a] reasonable belief that one has implied permission to drive his or her spouse's automobile may otherwise be inferred
from the mere existence of the marital relationship and from possession
of a set of keys . . .such an inference has clearly been rebutted in the
instant case." 1 "s Therefore, summary judgment was granted for the
insurer.163
In Samples v. Southern Guarantee Insurance Co.,'" the driver of a
vehicle involved in a collision spent a social evening at a friend's house.
While there he became intoxicated and fell asleep. After awakening and
175. For a typical exclusion of this type see, e.g., the 1986 Personal Auto Policy. ("Using

a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so.") ALLIANCE OF
AMERICAN INSURERS, 1989 POLICY KIT FOR STUDENTS OF INSURANCE 4
(1989).
176.

196 Ga. App. 340, 396 S.E.2d 66 (1990).

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 341, 396 S.E.2d at 67.
Id.
Id. at 343, 396 S.E.2d at 68-69.
Id. at 342, 396 S.E.2d at 68.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 343, 396 S.E.2d at 69.
197 Ga. App. 258, 398 S.E.2d 220 (1990).
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finding the keys left in the ignition lock, he drove away in his friend's car.
He was never told that he could drive his friend's car, nor was he ever
told that he could not. He merely assumed that his friend would not
mind. 16s The court held that such subjective belief was not reasonable as
a matter of law.'" While Harps conceded .that a reasonable belief of implied permission to use a spouse's car may be inferred from the existence
of the marital relationship, no such belief may be inferred from "the existence of merely a friendly relationship and from non-permissive access to
a set of keys to that automobile." 187 The court again granted a summary
judgment in favor of the insurer.'"
XIII. PRIMARY AND ExCESS CARRIERS
An apparent ambiguity is eliminated as a matter of law if the court
finds that seemingly divergent parts of a contract are capable of reconciliHence, no occasion to present the question of the contract's
ation.
meaning to the jury or to resolve it by recourse to contra proferentem
exists. In Southeast Atlantic Cargo Operators, Inc. v. First State Insurance Co.,190 the policy provided in its declarations that it was to be "'in
excess of . . . [t]he amount recoverable under the underlying insurance.' "910 In the text of the agreement, the policy provided, in pertinent
part, that the insurer would indemnify its insured for "'ULTIMATE
NET LOSS ... in excess of RETAINED LIMIT, as herein stated.' ""
The insurer's liability was "'only for the ULTIMATE NET LOSS in excess of... the INSURED'S:... UNDERLYING LIMIT - an amount
equal to the limits of liability indicated beside the underlying insurance
listed . . .plus the applicable limits of any other underlying insurance
collectible by the INSURED ... ."193 When the primary insurer became insolvent, the excess insurer claimed it was only liable for amounts
in excess of the primary's listed limit of five hundred thousand dollars,
even though that amount was not "recoverable." The court agreed.'" It
explained that, even if one concedes, arguendo, that "'[w]hen an excess
insurer uses the term "collectible" or "recoverable" it is agreeing to drop
down in the event the primary coverage becomes uncollectible or unrecov185.
186.

Id. at 259, 398 S.E.2d at 220.
Id., 398 S.E.2d at 221.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id. at 260, 398 S.E.2d at 221.
See statutory rules of construction O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2 (1990).
197 Ga. App. 371, 398 S.E.2d 264 (1990).
Id. at 371, 398 S.E.2d at 265 (quoting the insurance policy) (brackets in original).
Id. at 372, 398 S.E.2d at 265 (quoting the insurance policy).
Id. (quoting from policy).
Id. at 373, 398 S.E.2d at 266.
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erable. . . .'198 This was not the case here. The single reference to "recoverable" in the declarations page did not modify or negate the specific
liability limits set forth in the policy itself, which clearly precluded such
drop-down coverage.'"
This decision is a bit puzzling because drop-down coverage was not
only referred or alluded to in the declarations, but also in the body of the
policy itself. The very language upon which the court relies for its conclusion modified "underlying insurance" by using the word "collectible," a
synonym for the word "recoverable" as used in the declaration.
Southern GeneralInsurance Co. v.Boerste,1 " a case of first impression
in this state, involved two aviation liability insurance policies that were
potentially present upon the risk. The first policy was issued to the airplane's owner. It contained no "other insurance" clause. The second policy was issued to the company supplying the pilot.198 This policy contained an "other insurance" clause which provided that "'[ilf an Insured
... has other insurance against a loss covered by ... this policy, this
insurance shall be excess insurance only over any other valid and collectible insurance with respect to such Insured.' "" The court held that the
"principles of automobile liability insurance law" 00 that have already
been extended to motor boats by analogy should also be the policy issued
to the airplanes and aviation insurance201 Therefore, the policy issued to
the airplane's owner is generally the primary policy "'and the insurer issuing it is liable up to the limits of the policy without apportionment.' "102 The excess policy is unavailable until the primary policy is
exhausted.*'0
XIV. PUNrrIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages against an uninsured motorist carrier ("UMC") can
deter a known tortfeasor who is subject to the jurisdiction of the court
because the carrier, having paid its insured victim, may assert a subrogation claim against the tortfeasor. This factor persuaded the court of ap195. Id. (quoting United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 257 Ga.
77, 81, 355 S.E.2d 428, 431 (1987)) (brackets in original).
196. Id.

197. 195 Ga. App. 665, 394 S.E.2d 566 (1990).
198. Id. at 665, 394 S.E.2d at 567.
199. Id. at 666, 394 S.E.2d at 567-68 (quoting the insurance policy).
200. Id. at 667, 394 S.E.2d at 568.
201. Id. (citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Holton, 131 Ga. App. 247, 205 S.E.2d
872 (1974)).
202. Id. (quoting Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 181 Ga. App. 238,240,
351 S.E.2d 658, 660 (1986)).
203. Id.
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peals in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Weathers2" to
hold that punitive damages in these cases were permissible.20 The plain
statutory language requires UMCs "'to pay the insured all sums which
he shall be legally entitled to recover.' ""s Because the Uninsured Motorist Statutes " is remedial, it precluded a court-created exception for punitive daknages.20

In Roman v. Terrell,'"9 the court of appeals closely examined the statute and found its conclusion in Weathers to be incorrect.210 The Uninsured Motorist Statute requires an uninsured motorist carrier "to compensate its insured for all sums the insured could recover from the
tortfeasor because of bodily injury or property damage.'' The court determined that this language did not include punitive damages.' 1 ' The
court also re-examined its rationale in Weathers and concluded that the
potential deterrent effects of punitive damages upon known tortfeasors
because of subrogation "is ephemeral at best," since "most uninsured motorists are judgment proof."'1 Raising their premiums would not deter
known tortfeasors either because they carry no liability insurance by definition.214 The supreme court followed the court of appeals in Roman and
reversed Weathers.2 Therefore, the Uninsured Motorist Statute, pending legislative intervention, does not allow punitive damages, regardless of
whether the uninsured motorist is unknown and eludes the grasp of the
court, or whether the motorist is identified and subject to its jurisdiction.

XV. RES

JUDICATA

In Helmuth v. Life Insurance Co.,'"6 claimant brought an action
against an insurer for proceeds under a life insurance policy that named
her beneficiary. When she brought suit, she mistakenly assumed that the
204. 193 Ga. App. 557, 388 S.E.2d 393 (1989), rev'd, 260 Ga. 123, 392 S.E.2d 1, vacated,
195 Ga. App. 736, 394 S.E.2d 921 (1990).
205. 193 Ga. App. at 559, 388 S.E.2d at 394.
206. Id. at 558, 388 S.E.2d at 393 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1) (Supp. 1991)) (emphasis added).
207. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
208. 193 Ga. App. at 558, 388 S.E.2d at 394.
209.

195 Ga. App. 219, 393 S.E.2d 83 (1990).

210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 221, 393 S.E.2d at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 222, 393 S.E.2d at 86.

214. Id.
215. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Weathers, 260 Ga. 123, 392 S.E.2d 1 (1990). The
supreme court hat denied a writ of certiorari in Roman. 195 Ga. App. at 221, 393 S.E.2d at

85.
216.

194 Ga. App. 685, 391 S.E.2d 412 (1990).
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policy was valid and limited her pleadings and proof to breach of contract. After a judgment for the insurer on the grounds that the policy was
invalid, claimant brought a new action against the insurer in tort. She
asserted that the insurer was vicariously liable because its agent's imputable fraud had caused the issuance of the invalid policy.2 1' The court
barred the second action because claimant knew all the facts surrounding
the alleged fraud claim when she filed her first action, but neither
pleaded nor proved a tort in that action.' 1 Claimant asserted that "because she did not know the contract was invalid," she could not have included the tort claim in the prior action.21 ' The court rejected this argument as "spurious." 5 0 After Helmuth claimants against insurers are well
advised to plead and prove every theory of recovery that the facts may
conceivably yield, even if this means pleading in the alternative.
XVI.

STANDARD OR UNION MORTGAGE CLAUSE

The facts in Southern General Insurance Co. v. Key" 1 demand simplification to facilitate comprehension. A mortgaged his house to B. Subsequently, A mortgaged his house to C (by a second security deed). After A
died, C obtained a policy on the house that listed A as the insured and B
and C as loss payees under the standard or union mortgage clause. Later,
X, who was not the appointed administrator of A's estate, purported to
act for the estate and obtained a policy from the same insurer, listing A
as the insured and B as the only loss payee. Neither the insurer nor the
mortgagees knew of A's death when the insurer issued the policies."'
The insurer contended that both policies were void because A, having
died, lacked capacity to contract."' The court held that A was only the
"nominal insured" and "not the contracting party for either policy."'
The first policy was valid because when C purchased the policy, he had
an insurable interest in the house as a lienholder."M The second policy
was valid because it was purchased by X on behalf of A's estate which
also had an insurable interest in the house. Even assuming that the estate
could not recover under the policy"' because of X's unauthorized intervention, the policy was at least valid in regard to B, who had an insurable
217. Id. at 685, 391 S.E.2d at 413.
218. Id. at 686, 391 S.E.2d at 413-14.
219.

Id., 391 S.E.2d at 413.

220. Id.
221. 197 Ga. App. 290, 398 S.E.2d 237 (1990).
222. Id. at 291, 398 S.E.2d at 238.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226.

This was not an issue in this appeal Id. at 292, 398 S.E.2d at 238.
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interest in the house as a lienholder." 7 The customary provision in standard or union mortgage clauses "provide[s] that the mortgagee's right to
recover will not be affected or invalidated by any act or omission of the
mortgagor."' " Under Georgia law, such language creates "a separate contract between the mortgagee and the insurer."
While undoubtedly correct as to C's status, this decision is puzzling in
its implications relating to B's status. Acts or omissions by the mortgagor
that occur after he has secured a valid policy cannot detract from the
mortgagee's rights.2n Yet, the decision in Key seems to go beyond that.
The holding in Key implies that even acts or omissions at the very inception of the policy that prevent the formation of a contract between the
insurer and the mortgagor cannot prevent the formation of a separate
contract between the insurer and the mortgagee. Perhaps the court assumed sub silentio that B's assertion of its rights as a loss payee ratified
X's actions in procuring the policy.
XVII.

SUBROGATION AND INDEMNITY

First-party insurers learned long ago that equitable subrogation is too
open-textured for their perceived needs. Hence, first-party policies invariably contain conventional subrogation clauses that establish procedures
for subrogation. 2 1 Yet even these often fail of their intended purpose because they lack precision and specificity.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kershaw Manufacturing Co.2" 2
serves as a paradigmatic case on this point. In Kershaw the insurer, after
paying its insured for the total loss of a piece of industrial equipment,
sought reimbursement as a subrogee against the seller and manufacturer
of the equipment on the theory of negligence, breach of warranty, and
strict liability. 8 8 The policy subrogated the insurer "to all the insured's
rights of recovery against any person or organization.'' 4 This language
entitled the insurer to recover the proceeds of an action brought by the
insured.2" The language did not assign the insured's right of action, allowing the insurer to sue in its own right as a subrogee or assignee." 6
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See KENToN & Wmiss, supra note 4, § 4.2(b).
231. Conventional subrogation is particularly prevalent in those areas in which equitable
subrogation is generally unavailable, such as subrogation to contract rights of the insured.
232. 198 Ga. App. 153, 401 S.E.2d 23 (1990).
233.

Id. at 153, 401 S.E.2d at 24.

234. Id. at 154, 401 S.E.2d at 24 (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 154-55, 401 S.E.2d at 24-25.
236. Id. at 154, 401 S.E.2d at 24.
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Kershaw also reminds insurers they are at some risk when they pay
claims that are not clearly covered by their policies. If the court determines such payments were voluntary the court may deny subrogation.238 7
unjust enrichment, subrogation
Being a species of restitution to prevent
8
is not available to mere volunteers.2
An insurer cannot get subrogation against its own insured. It cannot
shift back to the insured the very loss the insured paid it to assumesso It
can be tempting to lose sight of this simple principle when more than one
insured is involved, and when the policy poses surface complexities. In
Curles v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,21° the lessor sued the
lessee of a trailer for property damage to the trailer. The lessor's insurer
paid for the damage under its first-party collision rider and sought subrogation against the lessee. The lessee contended that he was an additional
insured under the liability portion of the policy. In response, the insurer
directed the trial court's attention to the insured's policy. 41 "'The policy
expressly excluded from liability coverage "Property damage" to property
owned or transported by the "insured" or in the "insured's" care, custody
or control.' ","42 The trial court held that the lessee did not occupy the
status of an additional insured when he damaged the lessor's trailer. The
lessee, therefore, was subject to subrogation like any other third-party
tortfeasor. The court of appeals disagreed." s The trial court had overlooked the policy's coverage of the lessee, who had "[p]resumably ...
paid in his leasing fee some or all of the premium applicable to this
trailer.'4 The lessor's collision rider also covered the lessee as an additional insured.24 His status as a co-insured under the collision rider,
rather than his status as a co-insured under the liability coverage, immunized him against any attempts at subrogation.3"
47
In United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Sayler Marine Corp.,"
a leased tractor injured the lessee's employee while the employee was using the tractor. The employee brought an action for negligence against
the lessor. The lessor's liability insurer settled the action and obtained a
release. The insurer then sought indemnity from the lessee under a clause
237. Id. at 155, 401 S.E.2d at 25.
238. Id. For a criticism of the so-called "volunteer doctrine," see KmxroN & Wmiss,
supra note 4, § 3.10(d)(3).
239. See JPay,supra note 101, § 96(g).
240. 198 Ga. App. 857, 403 S.E.2d 458 (1991).
241. Id. at 857, 403 S.E.2d at 459.
242.

Id. (quoting from policy).

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 858, 403 S.E.2d at 459.
Id. at 857, 403 S.E.2d at 459.
Id. at 857-58, 403 S.E.2d at 459.
Id.

247.

196 Ga. App. 850, 397 S.E.2d 188 (1990).
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in the lease that, in essence; required indemnification for harm caused by
a combination of the lessor's and lessee's negligence."' The court held
that the insurer stated a cause of action for indemnity.2' Settlement of
the tort claim against the insured was not an admission that the insured
was the sole tortfeasor who "bore all liability for the injuries alleged in
the claim."" Accordingly, the settlement did not prejudice the insurer's
indemnity claim.2 1 Such prejudice would only occur if the insurer had
entered into a consent judgment in the underlying tort action.'
XVIII. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
A.

General

In Hall v. Canal Insurance Co., 25 a case of first impression in this
state, claimant was injured in an automobile accident and brought an action against the other driver. The driver's liability insurer filed an action
against him for a declaratory judgment that its policy provided no coverage. Claimant's uninsured motorist carrier entered a defense for the
driver in this action and won a judgment that liability coverage actually
existed.'" The court held that the UMC could not recover legal expenses
and attorney fees incurred in its successful defense of the declaratory
judgment action. 5 The statute provides in pertinent part that in cases
where "the insurer denies coverage and it is determined by declaratory
judgment ... that there is in fact coverage, the insurer shall be liable to
the insured for legal cost[s] and attorney's fees."" The statutory language precluded any liability by the insurer to the UMC. 57 Even if such
telic construction would better serve the public good, the court was "not
at liberty to disregard the plain wording of the statute
simply to advance
's
. . . [its] own notions of what the law ought to be."'
Is a self-insurer subject to a direct action or can it be joined in an action against the tortfeasor before the tortfeasor's liability is legally established? National Services Industries, Inc. v. Great Global Assurance
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 850-51, 397 S.E.2d at 188.
Id. at 851, 397 S.E.2d at 189.
Id., 397 S.E.2d at 188-89.
Id., 397 S.E.2d at 189.
Id.
195 Ga. App. 16, 392 S.E.2d 340 (1990).
Id. at 16, 392 S.E.2d at 341.
Id. at 17, 392 S.E.2d at 341-42.
Id., 392 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting O.C.G.A.

original).
257. Id.
258. Id.

§ 33-7-15(b.1) (Supp. 1991)) (brackets in
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Co. 3 " addresses this issue in a somewhat offbeat litigation context. Plaintiffs brought a personal injury action against the driver of a vehicle who
was allegedly responsible for a collision. Plaintiffs sued the self-insurer,
inter alia, in its capacity as the driver's employer, which was vicariously
liable for the alleged negligence, and in its capacity as self-insurer. Plaintiffs also served their two UMC's, which answered in their own names.'"
Subsequently, the self-insurer received summary judgment on plaintiff's
various tort claims, "such as respondeat superior and negligent entrustment," which plaintiffs had asserted against it."'
The court explained that "'a plan and certificate of self-insurance
serves as the substantial equivalent of an insurance "policy" for the purposes of [liability insurance].' "11Thus, self-insurers are no more vulnerable to a direct action before the plaintiff "has obtained a judgment
against the tortfeasor"'' " than are liability insurers. After resolution of
the tort issues, the court should have dismissed the self-insurer from the
case.'" The trial court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to hear further arguments and to rule that the self-insurer was "obligated... to pay the
full amount of any judgment entered against... [the driver] and that
the... [plaintiffs'] insurance carriers consequently had no potential liability under the ... policies in question." 2 "
An UMC, by filing defensive pleadings in its own name, "secures the
right to seek an adjudication against its insured on coverage issues as well
as to defend the claim against the uninsured motorist." 266 However, filing
these pleadings plainly does not secure "the right to obtain a declaratory
judgment against another insurer that is not properly before the court as
a party to the litigation."' 7 The court can only grant relief in a separate
and independent action for a declaratory judgment that names the selfinsurer and the original plaintiffs as defendants.'"O
B. Denial of Coverage by Liability Carrier
The Uninsured Motorist Act ("Act") provides that a motor vehicle is
uninsured, inter alia, when there is "liability insurance in existence but
the insurance company writing the insurance has legally denied coverage
259. 198 Ga. App. 258, 401 S.E.2d 286 (1990).

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 258, 401 S.E.2d at 287.
Id. at 259, 401 S.E.2d at 287.
Id. (quoting Twyman v. Robinson, 255 Ga. 711, 712, 342 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1986)).
Id., 401 S.E.2d at 288.
Id. at 259-60, 401 S.E.2d at 288.
Id. at 259, 401 S.E.2d at 287.
Id. at 260, 401 S.E.2d at 288.
Id. at 260-61, 401 S.E.2d at 288.

265.
266.
267.
268. Id.
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under its policy.'' In Moore v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 70 a liability insurer, which had been defending its insured
under a reservation of rights letter, instructed the attorney that it had
applied to withdraw from the case. The insurer then notified plaintiff and
his UMC that it was denying liability coverage on specified grounds.2
The court held that this denial rendered the involved vehicle uninsured
and thus triggered the uninsured motorist coverage.' 7 ' The policy in question only required that "'the insuring company den[y] coverage' ,73 instead of requiring that it legally deny coverage as mandated by the
Act.274 Since UMCs may offer .their insureds more liberal terms than
those prescribed by the Act, and since the liability insurer's actions
amounted to a denial within the policy limits, the policy, in effect, rendered the vehicle uninsured.2 Given the facts, the court expressly refrained from deciding whether the insurer's actions amounted to a legal
denial under the procedure articulated in Richmond v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.' 70
In Southern General Insurance Co. v. Thomas,'77 the UMC argued

that uninsured motorist coverage was only available when the insurer legally denies liability based on the absence of liability insurance when the
collision occurs.27 Conversely, the coverage is not available when "there
is a liability insurance in existence at the time of the collision and the
insurer issuing that liability policy only subsequently denies coverage on
the basis of its own insured's breach of policy condition.' 79 The court

skewered this argument by saying that the Act "provides only for the
liability carrier's legal denial of coverage to its insured and limits neither
the timing of nor the specific basis for that legal denial."' 80 The court's
reasoning comports with the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage. Any
acts after the collision which denude insured motorists of coverage under
269. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(iii) (Supp. 1991).
270. 196 Ga. App. 755, 397 S.E.2d 127 (1990).
271. Id. at 757, 397 S.E.2d at 129.

272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
Id. (quoting the insurance policy).
Id. at 757-58, 397 S.E.2d at 128-29.
Id. at 757, 397 S.E.2d at 129.

276. Id. at 759, 397 S.E.2d at 128 (declining to apply Richmond, 140 Ga. App. 215, 231

S.E.2d 245 (1976)). Under Richmond's procedure, the insurer's filing an action for a declaratory judgment against itsinsured satisfies the "legal denial" requirement. Id.
277. 197 Ga. App. 196, 397 S.E.2d 624 (1990).
278. Id. at 197, 397 S.E.2d at 625.
279. Id.
280. Id. (construing O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(iii) (Supp. 1991)).
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their liability policies leave the victims in the same position they would
have occupied had there never been any insurance at all.'1
C. Effect of Service Upon the UMC
What is a UMC's posture after being served? In Hulsey v. Standard
Guaranty Insurance Co.,"' plaintiff filed an action against an alleged
tortfeasor. For reasons not made clear in the opinion, plaintiff also served
defendant's UMC."' The carrier provided defendant with counsel and
filed an answer in defendant's name. Defendant later filed a counterclaim
through his own counsel. ' The court concluded that the original plaintiff, who was uninsured, was responsible for the action and entered judgment against defendant's UMC.' The court held that defendant (counterclaimant) was not entitled to a judgment against his UMC in the same
action because plaintiff properly served the UMC, and because the UMC
participated in the litigation. 2 " Service upon the carrier merely notified
the carrier, allowing it, at its own election, to "'file pleadings and take
other action allowable by law in the name of either the known owner or
operator or both or itself.' ,,287 Since it took none of these steps in its own
name, the carrier avoided becoming a party to the action. Thus, the court
could not enter a judgment against it in the original action.21 The insured will, therefore, have to seek his remedy in a separate action against
the carrier."'
The court in Maxwell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.3" clarified Hulsey's rationale. One should not read Hulsey as favoring
form over substance. In Maxwell the UMC filed an answer that, although
"denominated as being only that of John Doe," actually raised-defenses
to its own contractual liability under the uninsured motorist coverage.29
The UMC became a named party to the John Doe action, which entitled
it to contest John Doe's tort liability as well as its own contractual liability contracts."'
281. Id., 397 S.E.2d at 625-26.
282. 195 Ga. App. 803, 395 S.E.2d 282 (1990).
283. Id. at 803, 395 S.E.2d at 283. Plaintiff served defendant's UMC as provided by
O.C.G.A. I 83-7-11(d) (Supp. 1991). 195 Ga. App. at 803, 395 S.E.2d at 283.
284. 195 Ga. App. at 803-04, 395 S.E.2d at 283.
285. Id. at 804, 395 S.E.2d at 283.
286. Id.
287. Id. (quoting J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. Williams, 149 Ga. App. 258, 260, 253
S.E.2d 878, 881 (1979) (quoting predecessor statute to O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(d))).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. 196 Ga. App. 545, 396 S.E.2d 291 (1990).
291. Id. at 545, 396 S.E.2d at 292.
292. Id. at 546, 396 S.E.2d at 292.
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Time for Service Upon the UMC

Georgia's requirements for perfecting claims against the UMC in a
timely manner are simple in theory and occasionally harsh in practice.
The plaintiff must serve the UMC within the time required by law for
service upon the uninsured motorist in the tort action. 5 ' When the plaintiff files the complaint against the motorist before the expiration of the
applicable limitation, but service is made after that time, the filing tolls
the statute only when the plaintiff proves "'that he acted in a reasonable
and diligent manner in attempting to insure that a proper service was
made as quickly as possible.-,4
The court in Clark v. Safeway Insurance Co.'' held that a timely complaint against the uninsured motorist did not toll the limitation because
plaintiff's inability to locate and serve defendant did not explain or justify the fifteen-month delay in serving her insurer.2" The court reiterated
that the time for serving the UMC runs from the date the cause of action
against the motorist arises and not from the date the motorist is legally
shown to be uninsured or underinsured.' 7
The holding in Shepard v. Allstate Insurance Co. 3 ' illustrates the
harshness of this time constraint. In Shepard liability insurance coverage
simply vanished after the time for serving the UMC expired. A pedestrian
who was struck by a taxicab brought an action against its driver. Since
defendant had a valid liability policy, plaintiff did not perfect service
upon his UMC. About ten months after the statute of limitations expired,
defendant's liability insurer became insolvent. Plaintiff immediately perfected service upon his UMC.'" The court sided with the UMC and held
that service was simply too late.'0 0
Shepard and its antecedents remind attorneys to perfect service upon
all their clients' UMCs as a matter of routine, no matter how remote the
possibility that they may have to rely on the coverage afforded. Dewberry
v. State Farm Insurance Co.30 1 demonstrates how this precautionary step
is not a futile gesture. In Dewberry a UMC, after actively participating in
293. Vaughn v. Collum, 236 Ga. 582, 224 S.E.2d 416 (1976).

294. Forsyth v. Brazil, 169 Ga. App. 438, 313 S.E.2d 138 (1984) (quoting Childs v. Catlin,
134 Ga. App. 778, 781, 216 S.E.2d 360, 362 (1975)).
295. 198 Ga. App. 282, 401 S.E.2d 72 (1991).
296. Id. at 282, 401 S.E.2d at 73.
297. Id. Compare with Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bogan, 194 Ga. App. 824, 392
S.E.2d 33 (1990) (involving a 463-day delay under possibly extenuating circumstances,
which warranted remand to the trial court).
298. 198 Ga. App. 144, 400 S.E.2d 682 (1990).

299. Id. at 14-45, 400 S.E.2d at 682.
300. Id. at 145, 400 S.E.2d at 682.

301. 197 Ga. App. 248, 398 S.E.2d 266 (1990).
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a tort action, discovered that defendant carried enough liability coverage
to preclude its own liability. Although plaintiffs could not prevent a summary judgment dismissing the UMC from the action, they nevertheless
achieved their purpose. 802 By serving their UMC within the limitation period, plaintiffs "preserved their rights to reinstate their claim against the
UMC if and when the defendant is found to be uninsured or
underinsured." 0 8
The court favored substance over form in Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Cook.804 In Cook the carrier asserted the statute of limitations
defense, because the insured served the carrier with a "Second Original"
of the complaint rather than with a "Duplicate Original"' ' 5 before the
limitation period expired. The court quickly dismissed this piece of sophistry and held that a "Second Original," in every respect identical to a
"Duplicate Original" but lacking an original signature, served the notice
purposes of the statute.8 " A "Second Original," therefore, complied with
the statute. 0 7
XIX.

CONCLUSION

While this year's far-ranging jurisprudence in insurance law eludes any
attempt at a nutshell summary, some observations, uncluttered by anecdotal casuistry, are possible. One unifying theme noticed by this writer in
his twenty-six years as a court watcher is the judicial respect and deference accorded to legislation. Georgia appellate courts will stretch words
and sentences to their maximum etymological range in order to make
them conform to the perceived legislative intent. They will not usurp the
legislative function whatever temptations the exigencies of each case may
pose. Instead, they are content to tell the General Assembly that, by explicitly demanding results or leaving gaps which are incompatible with
the tenor and purpose of its laws, it may have stumbled here or there. On
several occasions, this practice has caused the General Assembly to return
to its drawing boards and make revisions. Montesquieu must have envisaged this process when he contended that a tripartite system of government was the best way to run a civilized society.
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